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Abstract
Selten (1980) showed that an evolutionary stable strategy must be a strict
Nash equilibrlum ín a truly asymmetric game. Examples show that a neutrally
stable strategy (NSS) may however be mixed.This paper shows that such examples
are non-generic: ín almost all truly asymmetric games, a mixed strategy
cannot be a NSS, and a NSS Ss generically strict. Hence evolutionary stability
and neutral stability are equivalent for almost all asymmetric games.
r
I started work on this paper while visiting the Nissenschaftszentrum Berlin,
and completed this version at CentER, Tilburg. I am grateful to both
instltutíons for theír hospítality.1
1. INTRODUCTION
The concept of an evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) was developed by
Maynard Smith and Price (1973) in the context of two-player symmetric games.
An ESS ís a symmetríc Nash equllibrium, which satisfíes a stability condltlon,
of being invulnerable to invasion by any other strategy which is also a best
resonse to it. Many games are however asymmetric, and a player can be in a
number of possible roles, or Information situations. The ESS concept was
extended to asymmetric games by Selten (1980, 1983), by considering the
situation príor to a player being assigned a role, thereby symmetrizíng the
game. Selten showed that the ESS concept ls very restrictíve in truly
asymmetric games,where two players are never in the same information situation
(i.e. they always have different roles): an evolutionary stable strategy must
be a strict Nash equilibrium of the agent normal form or normal form of the
game. Since many games do not have strict Nash equílibria (eg. games with only
mixed strategy Nash equilibria), this implies that ESS may not exíst in a
large class of truly asymmetric games.
The loAic underlying Selten's result can be illustrated by considering
the simplest case of a truly asymmetric game, where each player can be one of
two roles, 1 and 2. A behavior strategy in the symmetrized game is simply a
pair of strategies, one for each role. Let b-(bl,b2) be such a strategy, and
let bi be an alternative best response to b2. Consider the strategy b' -
(bi,bZ), which differs from s only with regard to the choice in role 1. It is
clear that b' is a best response to b. Further, since the mutant strategy
only d(Ifcrs in one Informatlon sltuatlon, iL effeclively never meets itself.
Consequently, the payoffs of both strategies against b' are equal, so that b
cannot be an ESS.
The above argument shows that b' and b have equal payoffs in the mixed
population. Indeed, a mutant which differs only at one information situation
cannot have a strictly greater payoff. It has therefore been suggested that
weaker notions of evolutionary stability could be less restríctive in truly2
asymmetric games. Selten proposed the notion of "limit ESS", but thís was
found to almost as restrictive - Samuelson ( 1991) showed that games wlth
two possible roles, a limit ESS must be in pure strategies. Maynard Smith's
(198"l.) neutrally stable strategy (NSS) ís an even weaker concept. Van Damme
( 1987) provídes an example of the "battle of the sexes" over the care of
offspring, where a mixed strategy ís neutrally stable, and ís also dynamically
stable. A similar example ls presented in the game G1. Thís game has a unique
Nash equilíbrium in mixed strategies, where the row player plays T wlth
probability b~(atb), and the column player plays L with probabílity bI(aib).
It can be verified that this mixed strategy is neutrally stable. It is also
possible to construct examples ín 3x3 games. These examples suggest that
weakening the ESS concept in the direction of neutral stability might
alleviate the existence problem ín asymmetric games.
Quite apart from íts possible role in allowing existence of equilibríum
in a larger class of games, neutral stability possesses an appeal in its own
ríght. The líterature on evolution and learníng i s in part a response to a
dis-satisfactSon wíth the requirements made on ralíonality and on knowledge by
traditional game theory. Evolutionary theory discards these assumptions, but
replaces them by appealíng to asymptotic behaviour in the presence of the twin
forces of natural selectíon~ímítation and mutatioNexperimentation. How
relevant are asymptotic results to a study of human societies? How seriously
should one take results, such as the claim that evolutlonary forces ensure
efficiency in a large class of repeated games? In thís context, neutral
stability is a more appealíng concept since ít places less reliance upon
random mutatlons, and more on the dynamics induced by payoff differences. Both
Fudenberg and Maskin ( 1990) and Binmore and Samuelson ( 1992) employ the weaker
concept oF neutral stability in deríving theír results on efficiency ín
undiscounted repeated games. In the context of cheap talk games, Warneryd
(1991) and Bhaskar ( 1992) similarly use this weaker notion to derive their
efffcíency results. In these contexts, of games wíth a non-trlvíal extensive3
form, neutral stab111ty is qualítatively weaker than ESS, and in fact weaker
in some respects than concepts such as the cyclically stable set (Gilboa and
Matsuí, 1991).
The maín result of this paper however belies the hope that neutral
stabílity will be sígnificantly weaker than ESS in truly asymmetric games. We
find that examples such as G1 are unusual, and the set of payoffs for which a
gíven game has a mixed strategy NSS, is a closed set of Lebesgue measure zero.
In other words, in almost all truly asymmetric games, a mixed strategy Nash
equilibrium cannot be neutrally stable. Since pure strategy Nash equilíbria
are generically strlct, this ímplies that a NSS must be a strict Nash
equílíbrium in almost all truly asymmetric games, and the concepts of NSS and
ESS coincide. We also show that our results extend when we consíder the
specíal case of symmetric games where players can conditíon theír choices upon
the role they play, although there is no asymmetry in payoffs. These results
contrast with the more positive results regardíng repeated games and cheap
talk games referred to earlíer. They suggest that games where a(non-trivial)
extensíve form is induced by a move of nature are quite different from games
where the extensive form is due to the moves of the players.
2. ASYt9~TRIC GAMES: DEFINITIONS AND A LOCAL CHARACTERIZATION
In thís section we introduce the asymmetric game set up, following Selten
(1980) and Van Damme (1987) closely. Consider a random-matching situation
where two players are chosen to play a bi-matrix game. Each of these players
can be in one of several tnformation situations. An information situation is a
complete description of the state of the player, and may include some
ínformation regarding the other player's state. Let U be the (finite) set of
information sítuations, and ~et Cu denote the finite set of choices available
at uEU. A contest is a pair, uv, of information situations. For each contest,
there ís a pair of matrices, A~v and A~u, the ij-th elements of which give4
the payoff to the player at u and v respectively when they adopt the i-th and
~-th pure strategy. A local strategy at u is an element of ACu, and w111 be
denoted by bu. A behavior strategy is a vector of local strategies, one for
each information situation, and will be denoted by b-(b1,b2,...,bu,..b~U).
Ne wríte B for the set of local strategies at u, and B for the set of u
behaviour strategíes.
The two players are randomly allocated to informatíon situations by a
symmetric probability distribution which is consistent ( see Van Damme, 1987).
In other words, p is a symmetric probabílity measure over UxU, wíth generic
element puv, whlch denotes the probabilíty of a uv contest with player 1 in
situation u. Let pu be the probabílity of player 1 being in information
situation u, and assume that pu ~ 0 for all u.
Let b and b' be two behavíor strategies. The expected payoff of b'
against b is given by:
A(b',b) -~ E p b'A' b (2.1) uvuuvv
u v
A strategy beB is said to be an Evolutionary stable stra[egy (ESS) if for
all b'sb,
bAb a b'Ab (2.2)
and
bAb - b'Ab ~ bAb'~ b'Ab' (2.3)
(2.2) requíres that b be a symmetric Nash equilibrium in the symmetrized
game, and (2.3) is the stability condition - if b' ís an alternatíve best
response to b, then b does strictly better against b' than b' does against
itself.
A game is said to be truly asymmetric if the two players are never in the
same information situation, i.e. if puu 0 for all u. In this paper we shall
concern ourselves only with truly asymmetric games. If ttU ís the number of
informatlon sítuat)ons, a truly asymmetric game can also be seen as a ftU5
person game with one player for each ínformation situation. This ís called
the agent normal form of the game.
Selten ( 1980) defínes the local game at u induced by b as the
symmetric bi-matrix game with pure strategy sets Cu and fitness matríx Au(b)
defined by:
Au(b) - Puu Auu } ~ puvAuvbv (2.4)
vsu
Wríte A(b,b';b,u) for the payoff of b against b' in the local game
índuced by b at u. Consider the special case where puu is zero, so that a
player in role u never meets a u-player. In this case, (2.4) shows that
A(b,b';b,u) is independent of b', and depends only upon b. Consequently, in a
truly asymmetric game, A(b,b';b,u) ís independent of b' for all u, and for all
b.
A strategy b is saíd to be a locally stable strategy (LSS) if bu is an
ESS of the local game at u for every ueU. Obviously, a strategy must be a LSS
íf it is to be an ESS. Unfortunately, the reverse is not true - a LSS need not
be an ESS, as the example in Van Damme (1987) shows. Intuitively, local
stability checks for stabilíty against mutants xhich vary their behavior at
single information sítuations. This is insufficient, since a mutant may be
able to do better by varying two or more information situations. Consequently,
global analysis is required in order to check whether a strategy is ESS.
Selten shows that one may obtain a local characterízation of ESS in truly
asymmetric games. This is possible since the ESS ís a very restrictive concept
in truly asymmetric games - any ESS must be a strict Nash equilibrium of the
agent normal form of the game, and hence a strict Nash equilibrium of every
local game. However, Selten's formuation does not allow a local
characterization of NSS even in truly asymmetric games, since a NSS need not
be a strict equilibrium.
The first result of this paper is to obtain a local characterization of
NSS in truly asymmetric games. This requires that we check for stabilíty only6
agaínst mutants which vary theír behavior at two information situations.
Define the local game at uv induced by b as follows: the game consists of
two information situations, u and v, with pure strategy sets Cu and Cv
respectívely, and payoff matrices Au(b), Av (b). Au (b) is defined by:
A (b,u,v) - P A' t P A' t ~ P A' b h (2.5)
u uu uu uv uv uw uw w
wsu,v
where h is the vector of ones, (1,1,....,1).
(2.5) shows that the payoff matrix at u ín the local game at uv deflned
by b, Au(b,u,v) is the probabílity weighted sum of payoff matrices of of the
bimatríx games at uu and uv, and a third matrix. Thís third matrix gives the
expected payoff to the i-th pure strategy (row) in Cu in contests uw given the
local strategies bw. This has constant rows since the payoff in contests uw
does not depend upon the choices made by the u-player or the v-player. The
payoff of a strategy b"-(b~,b~) against another strategy b'- (bu,b~) in the
local game defined by b at uv, ís given by :
A(b". b' : b. u, v) - p b„A. b. ~ p b„A. b, t p b„A. b. t P b„A. b, uuuuuu uvuuvv vvvvvv vuvvuu
t ~ p b„A. b t ~ P b„A. b (2.6)
uwuuww vwvvww
wsu,v wsu,v
A strategy b will be called pairwise neutrally stable strategy (PNSS)
if (bu,bv) ls a NSS of the local game defined by b at (u,v) for every pair
(u,v) in UxU. Notice ihat the local game defined by b at (u,u) coincides
with Selten's definition of the local game defined by b at u, so that pairwíse
neutral stability implies local neutral stabílity
Theorem 1. Let C be a truly asymmetric game. b is a NSS of i if and only if b
is a PNSS of I'.
Proof: Let b be a Nash equilibrium of the agent normal form. We can restríct
attention to mutants which are best responses to b, so let b' be an
alternative best response to b, so that A(b,b) - A(b',b). Consequently, b'u ís7
a best response to bu in the local game at u for every ueU. If b is a PNSS, we
have A(b,b';b,u) L A(b',b';b,u) for every u. Consider the sum:
S s ~ E {A(b,b';b,u,v) - A(b',b';b,u,v))
uYV v
- 2E E puv(bu - b~)Auvbv
u v





Since the first term on the right hand side of (2.7) is
[A(b,b')-A(b'b'), and since the second and third terms sum up to the
dífference in payoffs in all local games at u, we have:
A(b,b')-A(b'b') - SI2 - (~U-2)~ {A(b',b';b,u) - A(b,b';b,u))
u
(2.8)
If the game Ss truly asymmetric, A(b',b';b,u) - A(v,b';b,u) for every u, and
hence:
A(b,b') -A(b',b') - SI2 (2.9)
If b is a PNSS, each term in the summation (S) is non-negative and b is
an NSS. o
The íntuitíon behind theorem 1 suggests that ít should be possíble to
generalíze the result to games with more than two players. If m players are
randomly allocated to ~tU information situations, one needs to consider only
possible m-tuples of deviatlons. However, slnce evolutionary game theory has
focused on two-player games, we shall not pursue this generalízatíon.
Theorem 1 will play an important role ln our analysis: ít allows to
analyze neutral stability in the overall game at the level of pairwise neutral
stabilíty ín local games.8
3. GENFRIC RESIJl.TS FOR ASY141E1'RIC GAMES
In this section of the paper we rely upon theorem 1 in order to analyze
any OU type asymmetric game at the level of 2 types. In other words, we shall
analyze local games at pairs of ínformation sltuatíons. Our aim is to prove
the following theorem, xhích is the main result of the paper.
Theorem 2. Let I' be a truly asymmetríc game. For almost all payoff
matrices, Au~ , I' does not have a NSS in mixed strategies, and any NSS must
be a strict Nash equílibrium.
We prove the theorem by a seríes of lemmata. The first lemma shows that
if a NSS involves playing a mixed strategy in one information situation, u,
then ít must (generically) involve mixing in at least one other information
situation, v. The lemma states this result somewhat more generally, in terms
of the Nash equilibríum of the agent normal form of the game.
Lemma 1. Let b-(b1,b2,...bu,..b~U) be a Nash equilibrium of the agent
normal form of the game. If bu is a non-degenerate mixed strategy, then for
almost all games, there exists a v different from u such that bv is also a
non-degenerate mixed strategy.
Proof: Let cu,c~ E C(bu). If bw is a pure strategy for all w, so that
bw cw other than u, then :
Au(ci.c2....cu,...cn) - A~(ci,cZ,..cu...cn) (3.1)
In other words, the payoff to player u from two pure strategies is identícal,
fixing the pure strategies all other players. The set of games where any two
payoff entries of player at u are equal is a closed set one dimension less
than the dlmension of the space of payoffs. The set of games where payoffs to
any player are equal is finite union of ~tU closed sets of lower dimension, and
is hence a closed set of Lebesgue measure zero, in the space of payoffs. o
Lemma 1 establishes that in almost all asymmetrlc games, Sf an
equilibrium strategy involved mixing at one ínformation situation, ít must
ínvolve mixing in at least two information situations. A truly asymmetric
games defínes a n player agent-normal form game, and a neutrally stable9
strategy is necessaríly a Nash equilibrium of the agent normal form game.
Consequently, a mixed strategy NSS in truly asymmetríc game generically
involves playíng a míxed strategy in at least two information situatíons, u
and v.
Consíder the local game defined by b at the contest uv. A strategy in the
local game, buv, is gíven by a pair (bu,bv) where bueACuand bve~Cv, where
ACiis the set of probability measures on Cí. From (2.5), we write down the
payoff matríces in the local game. Since the game is truly asymmetric, pu~ 0.
Au (b,u,v) - PuvAuv } ~ PuwAuw
bwh (3.2)
wXU,V
Av (b,u,v) - PuvAvu } E P"wA~w bwh (3.3)
wsu,v
We shall show that if buv ís a(non-trivial) mixed strategy combinatíon,
then b cannot be a NSS of the local game at uv for almost all payoff
uv
matrices. The strategy of our proof will be to assume that buv is an NSS,
thereby deriving conditions on the payoff matríces which cannot be generically
satisfied. However, some notational simplification is worthwhile at thís
stage. Note that if (bu,bv) is a NSS of the local game at uv, then (bu,bv) is
a NSS of the local game where the player at u is restricted to mixed
strategies which are used with positive probabilíty by bu, and the same holds
for v. In other words, we consider the restricted game where players are
restricted to probability measures over the set of pure strategies which are
in the support of bu and bv. Wríte A for the restricted versíon of the payoff
matrix Au and B for the restricted version of the payoff matrix Av. Wríte
(p,q) for (bu,bv): sínce we are only consideríng the restricted game, both p
and q are in the interior of the simplex. A strategy, buv -(p,q) is a
neutraily stable strategy (NSS) ín the local game if for any other buv
(p'.q' ):
pAq ' P64 i P'Aq t pgq' (3.4)lo
and
PAq t PB9 - P~Aq t PBq~~ PAq~4 P~Bq ? P~Aq' f P'Bq' (3.5)
Let (p,q) be a completely mixed strategy NSS in the restrícted local
game. (p,y) is hence a mlxed strategy Nash equllibrlum, and let ~p and be 1 ~2
the equilibrium payoffs for the two roles. Since p and q are completely míxed
strategy Sn the restricted game, they satisfy:
Aq - ~Plh (3.6)
pB - q,2h (3.7)
where h ís a vector of ones, (1,1,...,1).
Lemma 2. For any mutant (p',q') !n the restricted game, the expected
payoff of the mutant and the expected payoff of the incumbent are equal ín any
mixed population, i.e.:
PAq t PBq - P~Aq i PBq' (3.8)
pAq' r p' Bq' - p' Aq' ~ p' Bq' ( 3. 9)
Proof: Since (p,q) is a completely mixed strategy in the restrícted game, p'
Ss a best response to q and q' is a best response to p, so that (3.8) follows.
Hence, if (p,q) is an NSS (3.10) must hold for all p',q' in the restricted
game:
(P-p')Aq' ~ p'B(q-q') ~ 0 (3.10)
(3.10) must hold with equality for all p',q'. Otherwíse, if there exists
p',q' such that the inequality ís strict, there exists p",q" such that the
inequality is reversed. Since p,q are both in the interior of the simplex,
there exist scalars x1~0 and aZ ~ 0 such that p" -(1-al)p 4 Alp', q" -
(1-a2)q t aZq' are both permisslble.
(p-p,.)Aq„ ~ p„B(q-q„) - x1A2[(p'-p)Aq' t p'B(q-q')] (3.11)
Since the sign of (3.11) ís the negative of the sign of (3.10), this
implies that (3.9) must hold for all p',q'. o
Lemma 3. Let C-AtB be the sum of restricted payoff matrices of the local
game at uv defined by b. If (p,q) is a NSS of the local game, then every 2x2
sub-matrix of C is non-invertible.11
Proof:Writing (3.9) for the case when p' is the ith pure strategy and q' is
the ,Jth pure strategy, thís requíres, that for all i,~:
pA~c t Bírq - a1~ i bi~ (3.12)
where jc subscripts the j-th column and ir the i-th row of the matríx.
Re-write (3.10) for the h-th row and J-th column, and subtract to obtain:
(8ír-Bhr)q - ci, - ch~ (3.13)
where ci~ - ai~ t b1~.
Notíce that while the right hand side of (3.13) involves elements in the j-th
row, the left hand side i s independent of j. Re-wríting (3.13) for colunm k,
and equating, we get:
ci~ t chk - cík i ch~ (3.14)
Sínce h,i,j and k were arbitrarily chosen, (3.14) holds for every row and
every column., and every 2x2 sub-matrix of the matrix C must have a vanishing
determínant. a
Proof of theorem 2. Given a space of nxn square matrices, the set of
non-invertible matrices is a closed set of Lebesgue measure zero in this
space ( see Hoffman, 1975, for example). Lemma 3 establishes that
every 2x2 sub-matrlx of the matrix C is non-invertible. From (3.2) and
(3.3), C is the weighted sum of two-matrices each of which is the sum of a
primítive payoff matrix of the agent normal form of the game, and a matrix
with constant rows. It follows that the set of matrices Au~ and A~u
which satisfy paírwlse local stabilíty at the local game at uv ís of ineasure
zero. Since theorem 1 shows that pairwise neutral stability is equivalent
to overall neutral stability, this establíshes that almost all truly
asymmetric games do not have a mixed strategy NSS. Since pure strategy
NSS are generícally strict, theorem 2 follows. o
Theorem 2 applies to games where the underlyíng game is asymmetric. A
class of asymmetríc games are those where the game itself is symmetric,
but where players may condition their choice of strategy upon the role they
fill (see, for example, the discussion ín Van Damme, 1987 or Samuelson, 1991).12
It may be thought that symmetríc games of this class are a special case of
asymmetric games more generally. However, for questíons of genericlty, the
distínctlon could make a difference. In the case where the underlying
game is symmetric, the dimension of the set of payoffs is 1tS2, where qS is the
number of pure strategies ín each player's strategy set. Thís is one-half the
dimensionalíty of the set of payoffs if we consider the underlying game to be
asymmetric.
However, ít Ss easy to show that a mixed strategy NSS ís non-generíc
even ín this class of games. If payoff functions are symmetric, it
follows that in the local game defined by b at uv, the payoff matrix B equals
the transpose of A. Hence, the matrix C, which is the sum of A and B, ís
symmetric. However, C must stíll satisfy the condítion of lemma 3, i.e. every
2x2 sub-matrix of C must be non-invertible. Hence, even within the class of
symmetric matríces, the set of matrices satisfying lemma 3 is of ineasure zero.
The implication of this result may be seen in 2x2 games. If we consider the
class of symmetríc 2x2 games, a game possesses a mixed strategy NSS only if it
is zero-sum.
4. CONCLUSIONS
This paper has shown that in generíc truly asyduoetric games, a NSS must
be a strict Nash equilibrium. Consequently, the distinction between NSS and
ESS ís not important in such games. This result assumes signifícance ín the
context of the existing results analysing other classes of games wíth a
non-trivial extensive form. In repeated games or games with pre-play
communication, neutral stability is a signifícantly weaker notion than
evolutionary stability, and ís in fact weaker in many ways than other
equilibrium concepts. Thís suggests that games where the extensive form ís
induced by a move of nature (such as the asymmetríc games consídered ín this
paper) differ significantly from games where the extensive form is induced
by choíces of players.13
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